I don't disagree with the first paragraph at all. The founding fathers had no advance knowledge of such things so therefore were unable to make specific provisions for them. That is what the judicial branch is for....to interpret these basic tenets as society and technology moves forward. Smart fucking guys, those founding fathers!
However, according to at least one source I found (perhaps not official nor authoritative nor unimpeachable but at least apparently unbiased), your second paragraph does not hold true. A person can be detained and even searched to a limited extent if the investigating officer has reasonable suspicion about the subject (a very broad term for sure). Here's the source:
"There are some exceptions to these general rules. Police may briefly detain and conduct a limited search of a person in a public place if they have a reasonable suspicion (bold emphasis is mine) that the person has committed a crime. Reasonable suspicion is a level of belief that is less than probable cause. A police officer possesses reasonable suspicion if he has enough knowledge to lead a reasonably cautious person to believe that criminal activity is occurring and that the individual played some part in it. In practice this requirement means that an officer need not possess the measure of knowledge that constitutes probable cause to Stop and Frisk a person in a public place. In any case, an officer may not arrest a person until the officer possesses probable cause to believe that the person has committed a crime."
URL is here:
http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/probable+cause
I'm no legal scholar but, according to this synopsis of
INS vs Delgado that you mentioned, it appears that the decision of the lower appeals court ruling in favor or Mr. Delgado was reversed by the US Supreme Court:
U.S. Supreme Court
INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210 (1984)
Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Delgado
No. 82-1271
Argued January 11, 1984
Decided April 17, 1984
466 U.S. 210
Syllabus
Acting pursuant to warrants issued on a showing of probable cause that numerous unidentified illegal aliens were employed at a garment factory, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) conducted two "factory surveys" of the workforce in search of illegal aliens. A third factory survey was conducted with the employer's consent at another garment factory. During each survey, which lasted from one to two hours, INS agents positioned themselves near the factory exits, while other agents moved systematically through the factory, approaching employees and, after identifying themselves, asking the employees from one to three questions relating to their citizenship. If an employee gave a credible reply that he was a United States citizen or produced his immigration papers, the agent moved on to another employee. During the survey, employees continued with their work and were free to walk around within the factory. Respondent employees -- who were United States citizens or permanent resident aliens and who had been questioned during the surveys -- and their union filed actions, consolidated in Federal District Court, alleging that the factory surveys violated their Fourth Amendment rights, and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The District Court granted summary judgment for the INS, but the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the surveys constituted a seizure of the entire workforces, and that the INS could not question an individual employee unless its agents had a reasonable suspicion (bold emphasis is mine) that the employee was an illegal alien.
Held: The factory surveys did not result in the seizure of the entire workforces, and the individual questioning of the respondent employees by INS agents concerning their citizenship did not amount to a detention or seizure under the Fourth Amendment. Pp. 466 U. S. 215-221.
(a) Interrogation relating to one's identity or a request for identification by the police does not, by itself, constitute a Fourth Amendment seizure. Unless the circumstances of the encounter are so intimidating as to demonstrate that a reasonable person would have believed he was not free to leave if he had not responded, such questioning does not result in a detention under the Fourth Amendment. Pp. 466 U. S. 216-217.
(b) The entire workforces of the factories were not seized for the duration of the surveys here, even though INS agents were placed near
Page 466 U. S. 211
the exits of the factory sites. The record indicates that the agents' conduct consisted simply of questioning employees and arresting those they had probable cause to believe were unlawfully present in the factory. This conduct should not have given respondents, or any other citizens or aliens lawfully present in the factories, any reason to believe that they would be detained if they gave truthful answers to the questions put to them or if they simply refused to answer. If mere questioning did not constitute a seizure when it occurred inside the factory, it was no more a seizure when it occurred at the exits. Pp. 466 U. S. 217-219.
(c) Since there was no seizure of the workforces by virtue of the method of conducting the surveys, the issue of individual questioning could be presented only if one of the respondent employees had, in fact, been seized or detained, but their deposition testimony showed that none was. They may only litigate what happened to them, and their description of the encounters with the INS agents showed that the encounters were classic consensual encounters, rather than Fourth Amendment seizures. Pp. 466 U. S. 219-221.
REHNQUIST, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C.J., and WHITE, BLACKMUN, STEVENS, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined. STEVENS, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 466 U. S. 221. POWELL, J., filed an opinion concurring in the result, post, p. 466 U. S. 221. BRENNAN, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which MARSHALL, J., joined, post, p. 466 U. S. 225.
Again, and not trying to be a dick here but, where is the precedent or "settled law" as you call it that legitimizes this statement? I'd really love to see it....I mean that. I am absolutely for individual rights but you aren't providing me with anything other than conjecture and opinion to substantiate your contention. I am looking for third-party validation of your stance. So far, I don't see it.
I understand that. However, I see no evidence that there is a direct correlation between these principles and the new immigration law that is now in effect in Arizona. Again, I would love to be presented with concrete evidence to refute what I have presented to the contrary but I just don't see it. I can't find it anywhere and I don't think you can either.
This is quite disturbing since these "probable cause" and "reasonable suspicion" laws seem to be extremely vague at best and apparently give the government (and, even more bothersome, individual law enforcement personnel) a very wide range of authority and autonomy to act as they see fit in any given circumstance without much restraint.
It will be fascinating to see what the eventual outcome of whatever upcoming litigation may be filed on behalf of those who would seek to repeal this law. If they have more precedent than you and I have been able to obtain, God bless them because without it, I don't see any substantive evidence that would cause any higher court to declare this law to be unconstitutional.
