[ PART 1/2 ]
mcrocket said:
So you are a NASA engineer? Well that explains alot.
Facinating job I assume you have.
I used to be a NASA engineer.
I stated this from the get-go in this thread, and explicitly said I'm going to be "biased" as a result.
At the same time, I think you aren't giving me credit for being CRITICAL of NASA.
I have been so repeatedly, including saying I would NEVER fly on the STS -- especially not mid-1997 on-ward.
Now I've also worked in the private sector as well as a defense contractor on everything from Navstar (GPS) to commercial space launch systems to missile defense.
mcrocket said:
Here is an example of that meeting I was talking about:
www.onlineethics.org/moral/boisjoly/RB1-6.html
Okay, now this is what I knew about -- it's not uncommon.
Literally dozens of exceptions are made every launch -- because if there isn't an exception granted, NO SHUTTLE would EVER take off!
Same deal with Apollo before it, Gemini before that, etc...
The STS is basically one big, huge failure ready to happen, like any spacecraft.
The standard of experimental aircraft definitely applies here, you just try to mitigate risks as best as you can.
Dozens of engineers scream about something being wrong, they are evaluated, and gaged whether or not the risk is acceptable or not.
In the case, the rule of no launch below 53 degrees F wasn't good enough IMHO, and it was a poor mitigation post-1985.
I stress post-1985, because before 1985 and the sealant change, the risk was mitigated.
This reasoning goes back to -- yet again -- the MRs, the ROOT CAUSE!
Had proper MRs been done on the sealant change, then the real risk that O-Rings could break at lower temperatures would have been known.
But they were not, and the statistics of 1981-1984 gave managers reason and proof to believe the risk was mitigated.
It was only recent history that there were any O-Ring issues, and that goes back to the sealant change.
Had the MRs been done proper, then management would have been quite aware that there was a reason for concern.
Instead, they incorrectly concluded that the risk was mitigated.
This happens dozens upon dozens of times per launch.
Otherwise, no STS would EVER leave the pad.
This engineer is clearly reading things how he wants to see them.
I know, I can do the same -- but sometimes, I have to step back and separate the "honest concern" from the "demonizing anyone who doesn't agree with my risk assessment."
In the end, the engineer was right, and he did his job.
But you also have to understand the ROOT CAUSE on why the administration did not heed the warnings -- the lack of good MRs that would have backed up his argument.
This is a repeat theme at NASA, one that they have ONLY learned with STS.
And that's the fact that you don't procure a bunch of materials and don't ever have to re-order because the program lasts less than 5 years.
So now more than ever, management needs to take the MRs more seriously.
Anytime any change occurs in a material, the entire STS system essentially has to be re-certified.
That's impossible, but at least more attention to MRs could further mitigate risks as best as possible.
The most deadly assumption is to use statistics that are incorrect because they are based on a prior "revision" of the STS as a whole.
MRs are the best way to combat that, or at least the best way we know of.
mcrocket said:
Then that (imo) practically confirms that they knew there was a potential serious problem.
Do you KNOW how many meetings that are like this for EVERY SINGLE STS launch?!?!?!
There have been countless other issues than just the sealant on the O-Rings, and the EFT (external fuel tank) insulation materials.
Risk is mitigated to the best of NASA's judgement, and they ended up being wrong.
Why? The overriding and repeat reason, again, is the lack of attention to MRs.
Had MRs been giving the importance they should, and the attention they need, managers would have at least know to consider the fact that their statistics from 1981-1984 was NOT APPLICABLE.
Again, I'm not interested in the "here'n now" blame of NASA or political considerations.
I'm here to discover WHY the social processes fail -- and that's almost always because someone VIOLATES a core engineering principle.
Even the alleged "Go Fever" has a technical cause -- and that is that with dozens upon dozens of "it's going to blow up" statements from engineers, you finally have to say you've mitigated the risk as best as you can at some point.
Otherwise, the STS would NEVER leave the ground -- PERIOD and we would have NEVER seen even STS-1.
mcrocket said:
And they, imo, should have cancelled the launch.
It seems like common sense to me.
And I can point you to hundreds of engineers who believe other launches should have been scrubbed as well.
If NASA administrators canceled every launch whenever an engineer felt the launch was at major risk, we'd NEVER have any STS launches.
mcrocket said:
The report (on the Columbia disaster) that you are so quick to dismiss was all the public has to go on.
I did NOT "dismiss it."
I only dismissed YOUR rather simplistic interpretation of it.
Now that I've seen the article, I know EXACTLY what you are talking about.
You, like most of the public, make it "cut'n dry" -- some engineer said "don't launch."
Again, if that was the case, and NASA NEVER launched when an engineer said something, we'd have 0 STS launches to date.
mcrocket said:
You are asking me to dismiss the report as political;
No. I dismissed your original interpretation as political non-sense.
mcrocket said:
even though you apparently are part of NASA?
I was.
mcrocket said:
You don't think there is a conflict of interest there?
No, because I've been extremely critical of the CFC-less insulation myself since 1997!
I would have NEVER gotten on the STS after the EFT insulation change, and I let people know that.
mcrocket said:
I see no reason to dismiss the report as political and innaccurate.
Once again, I dismissed YOUR INTERPRETATION of it, not the link you posted.
The public has a tendency to oversimplify things, and this is a perfect example.
I've seen people in this situation at aerospace companies first hand -- even when there aren't people's lives on-the-line.
What you call "Go Fever" I call "okay, at what point is the risk mitigated enough?"
The concept of "think like an administrator" is very applicable -- because administrators are the ones who make the tough decisions.
And they're also "stuck with the check" when they make the wrong call.
It's kinda funny because the "wrong call" can sometimes be don't launch, and that has NOTHING to do with "Go Fever."
mcrocket said:
You are going to have to give me more info then what you have to do that. Alot more.
Huh? You're the one who offered YOUR INTERPRETATION of that link.
Once I saw the link, I was TOTALLY FAMILIAR with this situation -- NOT your "interpretation" of it.
No offense, but you just have to believe me on this, you have to work in such an engineering setting where EVERYONE WILL DIE EVERY LAUNCH!
That's the reality of space flight.
It's literally like taking a regular end-user automobile and driving its top speed off-the-bat, right from the dealer's lot with 0 miles.
You've had 0 miles to base how the car will perform -- you're stuck with what you get, so you do your damn best to mitigate every risk you can think of.
[ SIDE NOTE: At this point, NASA has concluded they can NEVER adequately mitigate the risk of a vehicle mounted parallel with the launch vehicle.
They believe the STS replacement should be a vehicle that is mounted atop of the launch vehicle.
That way, even if there is a critical malfunction, the survivability of the crew compartment is increased by several orders of magnitude.
Right now, the orbiter is just dead meat if the EFT goes, as well as subject to anything falling off it. ]
mcrocket said:
In all honesty, I believe you are making excuses because you are too close to the program.
It's natural. It's human.
What "excuses"?!?!?!
Give me some God damn credit here -- I've been more than "open" with the serious and critical issues at NASA for manned spaceflight.
I'm just not willing to oversimply it into a "these people are wrong" type of political non-sense.
The engineering model is not being adhered to as it should, and MRs are the repeat ROOT CAUSE.
The STS is one big, huge failure ready and waiting to happen.
For the same reasons as the recent tragedy, as much as the O-Ring.
But unlike the O-Ring, which was a sealant change within 12 months of the disaster -- we had 5 years of CFC-less foam to worry about.
And every time, there was a combination of political and other influence NOT to make a big deal about using CFC-less foam.
It was considered "politically incorrect" to say we should go back to CFC foam.
In fact, even when someone high up in NASA pushed hard to reconsider, and even got EPA approval to do so, environmentalist groups had a field day!
"NASA doesn't care about the environment. NASA wants to destroy the Ozone. Etc..."
To be continued ...