There's a lot of media ignorance on the recent activation of US missile defense systems. Most of it has to do with the fact that they don't understand both our Theater Missile Defense (TMD) and National Missile Defense (NMD) capabilities, and what we could and could not use. Missile defense is just a layered approach that is a general outgrowth of general air defense. It's not a "discrete" technology change from what we were doing before, but technology has allowed us to improve air defense in general.
Two major advances in the last 2 decades have allowed missile defense to become reality:
1. Significant sensor and detection improvements
2. Hit-to-kill guidance
#1 was just an outgrowth of our other military advancements in radar, command'n control and coordinated tracking. We build early, manually-operated early warning systems in space and on the ground (e.g., Alaska-Canada) to detect Soviet launches. More on the ground, SAM fire-control radars have become more and more automated when it comes to auto-detection and response to air threats. The result is that we have now built both an overlapping, but coordinated, mobile ground and well as space-based detection and tracking infrastructure that allows us to detect launches anywhere in the world, including "just over the horizon" on the battlefield. E.g., the radar and fire control system for PAC-3 and THAAD can detect and track much farther than the inceptors can -- giving the US Army on the ground the ability to "see everything," even if it's the Navy's Block IIA or Air Force's NMD that shoots it down.
#2 was proven a reality the second NASA proved you could dock two objects in space -- "hit a bullet with a bullet" -- that's literally what you do with launching two vehicles that will dock in orbit. Before then, engineers rolled their eyes at the sheer magnitutde of the precision required. Nowdays, our guidance systems on interceptors are able to calculate this in real-time, tens of minutes before they even approach the target, so this can be done in real-time. Proximity-fuse has always been a poor means of shooting down an aircraft, much less a ballistic missile, and hit-to-kill solves it far, far better. A major issue with Patriot was that even when got proximity and "hit," over 60% of the targets were still intact enough to cause damage. With PAC-3, that now drops to under 20%.
Again, going back, Patriot was designed for shooting down aircraft, not missiles. Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC) was designed for shooting down missiles. PAC-3 uses hit-to-kill to travel faster, hit harder and obliterate with pure kenetic energy, all while being smaller and cheaper to operate than Patriot or PAC-2. PAC-3 is the 3-7 mile, lower altitude interceptor.
Middle-range intercepters that cover high-altitude (10+ miles), but are not exo-atmospheric, include Theater High Altitute Air Defense (THAAD) and the Navy Block II missile. THAAD is also hit-to-kill solution that travels much, much faster than PAC-3. It uses a similiar, mobile deployment strategy with radar and fire control system "where needed" to protect American assets.
Also middle-range, Navy Block II missiles are older, proximity-fuse, largely designed to not only shoot down aircraft, but slower moving surface-to-surface missiles (with a Phalanx gatling gun being the "last resort" for the "last mile" before getting hit). But even though it was designed for more "down-range" intercept, their speed and distance make them also ideal as a complement to THAAD -- but on the sea. The integrated Navy Theater Wide (NTW) radar and fire control system is designed to allow a pair of US cruisers to defend not only the carrier group in-between, but allow the US Navy to defend land masses too!
E.g., parking a Aegis cruiser on each side of the 38th parallel, while PAC-3 and THAAD platforms on the ground, each do their part to discover, track and and knock down North Korean launch vehicles before they even get near South Korea.
Now what the media gets their panties in a bunch is NMD. They've stopped talking about TMD, because the damn thing works damn well (thanx to extensive funding under Clinton no less), and they've moved on to NMD. NMD wasn't moved on since Reagan, although R&D under Reagan built one hell of an inceptor! With another 20 years of track and fire control technology, NMD is a reality.
Where NMD differs from TMD is its exo-atmospheric nature. The concept behind NMD is to hit (and kill) a WMD on a MRBM or ICBM outside the atmosphere, because it's likely been armed at that point. Because if the TMD systems fail to knock down a launch during its boost phase (e.g., Aegis cruisers around and PAC-3/THAAD assets on the ground, Korea, the initial launch point), then it's less favorable for the TMD systems to attempt again on re-entry (e.g., PAC-3/THAAD assets in the US as the armed WMD is above our soil, the target of the missile) -- NMD "layer" becomes the ideal point of intercept.
NMD is very high velocity (approaching escape velocity, e.g., Mach 10+), which also makes hit-to-kill a necessity (while being the most effective at the same time). That also means probability of intercept goes down. The current 4 out of 7 intercept rate is typical -- sub-50% would not be unheard of. Which is you would launch multiple NMD interceptors to increase probability of hit -- and why NMD is only useful for limited defense (and not en-masse against China or a major superpower).
It's also why you also have TMD like PAC-3 and THAAD not only near the target point (e.g., on US soil) in case NMD misses (the "last resort"), but you put them near the launch point if you can. E.g., again, US Navy Theater Wide with Block II in the waters around and US Army radar and fire control with PAC-3 and THAAD on the ground in Korea. Layered defense -- each layer with multiple intercept attempts increasing probability.
Which is where the "real world" comes in. Right now, the US is extremely unlikely to attempt an intercept of any North Korean test. Why? Because the "most ideal" phase to shoot it down is at boost. I.e., knock the fucker down just as it hits Mach, well before it approach atmosphere exit and higher velocities. That would clearly be a violation of North Korean airspace and despite how we justified it, it would look bad. Which means that we're left with Alaska-based NMD and, as a "last resort," US-based TMD.
Which means the only scenario that we'd "knock it down" would be if the missile clearly has a trajectory that comes anywhere near the US. That's why the NMD and TMD radar and fire control systems have been activated. NTW and US Army TMD will track it as it leaves North Korea -- something we didn't have in 1998. At that point, the US will likely dismiss it as a threat and do little more than let NMD-based tracking take over and play simulatated intercepts.
However, if trajectory suggests it is a threat to the US or any of its allies, that's when NMD will launch multiple exo-atmosphere interceptors into near orbital trajectoris on sounding rockets. Mid-boost sounding, as the North Korean missile trajectory matures, an intercept will become a go/no-go decision. BTW, I'm sure a "no go" will still be taken as a "failure" or "attempt" because we merely launched the interceptors (even though they were not used). But if an intercept is decided on, and NMD fails, then it falls to TMD assets on the ground. And at that point, TMD will work. At the same time, TMD will intercept within 10 miles of altitude (it's very likely to work -- trust me, if not THAAD then definitely PAC-3!) and US/ally land, and North Korea will jump for joy that they can hit the US or one of its key allies.
Kinda ironic if you ask me!
I mean, if we believe it's on a trajectory to hit US/ally soil, and we intercept with NMD in space over international waters, we'll be lambasted for doing so. North Korea can fall back and claim it was a "space launch" even though we'll show it had no where near the exit velocity required, and was heading right towards US/ally soil. No one will understand the first thing about how NMD works, and why and where it must intercept exo-atmospherically (and not just above US/ally soil) -- let alone most people will say, "it was in space, it wasn't headed towards the US" not knowing the first thing about exit velocity and trajectories.
And if we fail to intercept with NMD, North Korea will violate our airspace and will get away with it (virtually no one but the UK will demand an apology with us) -- even if we intercept with TMD. NMD will look like a failure and no one will talk about how TMD did worked (just like they stopped talking about how TMD didn't work when it did again and again).
It's really a "no win" scenario for the US if North Korea fires a missle and it's on a trajectory towards US/ally soil. But we are activating it just in case there is that attempt -- accidental or otherwise. Last time I checked, North Korea (let alone nor does China, India, etc...) doesn't believe in installing flight termination systems -- so they can't blow it up if it boosts with an incorrect trajectory. But unlike in 1998, we now have the tools to shoot it down if it flies over Japan or other allies, let alone anywhere near US soil.
Two major advances in the last 2 decades have allowed missile defense to become reality:
1. Significant sensor and detection improvements
2. Hit-to-kill guidance
#1 was just an outgrowth of our other military advancements in radar, command'n control and coordinated tracking. We build early, manually-operated early warning systems in space and on the ground (e.g., Alaska-Canada) to detect Soviet launches. More on the ground, SAM fire-control radars have become more and more automated when it comes to auto-detection and response to air threats. The result is that we have now built both an overlapping, but coordinated, mobile ground and well as space-based detection and tracking infrastructure that allows us to detect launches anywhere in the world, including "just over the horizon" on the battlefield. E.g., the radar and fire control system for PAC-3 and THAAD can detect and track much farther than the inceptors can -- giving the US Army on the ground the ability to "see everything," even if it's the Navy's Block IIA or Air Force's NMD that shoots it down.
#2 was proven a reality the second NASA proved you could dock two objects in space -- "hit a bullet with a bullet" -- that's literally what you do with launching two vehicles that will dock in orbit. Before then, engineers rolled their eyes at the sheer magnitutde of the precision required. Nowdays, our guidance systems on interceptors are able to calculate this in real-time, tens of minutes before they even approach the target, so this can be done in real-time. Proximity-fuse has always been a poor means of shooting down an aircraft, much less a ballistic missile, and hit-to-kill solves it far, far better. A major issue with Patriot was that even when got proximity and "hit," over 60% of the targets were still intact enough to cause damage. With PAC-3, that now drops to under 20%.
Again, going back, Patriot was designed for shooting down aircraft, not missiles. Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC) was designed for shooting down missiles. PAC-3 uses hit-to-kill to travel faster, hit harder and obliterate with pure kenetic energy, all while being smaller and cheaper to operate than Patriot or PAC-2. PAC-3 is the 3-7 mile, lower altitude interceptor.
Middle-range intercepters that cover high-altitude (10+ miles), but are not exo-atmospheric, include Theater High Altitute Air Defense (THAAD) and the Navy Block II missile. THAAD is also hit-to-kill solution that travels much, much faster than PAC-3. It uses a similiar, mobile deployment strategy with radar and fire control system "where needed" to protect American assets.
Also middle-range, Navy Block II missiles are older, proximity-fuse, largely designed to not only shoot down aircraft, but slower moving surface-to-surface missiles (with a Phalanx gatling gun being the "last resort" for the "last mile" before getting hit). But even though it was designed for more "down-range" intercept, their speed and distance make them also ideal as a complement to THAAD -- but on the sea. The integrated Navy Theater Wide (NTW) radar and fire control system is designed to allow a pair of US cruisers to defend not only the carrier group in-between, but allow the US Navy to defend land masses too!
E.g., parking a Aegis cruiser on each side of the 38th parallel, while PAC-3 and THAAD platforms on the ground, each do their part to discover, track and and knock down North Korean launch vehicles before they even get near South Korea.
Now what the media gets their panties in a bunch is NMD. They've stopped talking about TMD, because the damn thing works damn well (thanx to extensive funding under Clinton no less), and they've moved on to NMD. NMD wasn't moved on since Reagan, although R&D under Reagan built one hell of an inceptor! With another 20 years of track and fire control technology, NMD is a reality.
Where NMD differs from TMD is its exo-atmospheric nature. The concept behind NMD is to hit (and kill) a WMD on a MRBM or ICBM outside the atmosphere, because it's likely been armed at that point. Because if the TMD systems fail to knock down a launch during its boost phase (e.g., Aegis cruisers around and PAC-3/THAAD assets on the ground, Korea, the initial launch point), then it's less favorable for the TMD systems to attempt again on re-entry (e.g., PAC-3/THAAD assets in the US as the armed WMD is above our soil, the target of the missile) -- NMD "layer" becomes the ideal point of intercept.
NMD is very high velocity (approaching escape velocity, e.g., Mach 10+), which also makes hit-to-kill a necessity (while being the most effective at the same time). That also means probability of intercept goes down. The current 4 out of 7 intercept rate is typical -- sub-50% would not be unheard of. Which is you would launch multiple NMD interceptors to increase probability of hit -- and why NMD is only useful for limited defense (and not en-masse against China or a major superpower).
It's also why you also have TMD like PAC-3 and THAAD not only near the target point (e.g., on US soil) in case NMD misses (the "last resort"), but you put them near the launch point if you can. E.g., again, US Navy Theater Wide with Block II in the waters around and US Army radar and fire control with PAC-3 and THAAD on the ground in Korea. Layered defense -- each layer with multiple intercept attempts increasing probability.
Which is where the "real world" comes in. Right now, the US is extremely unlikely to attempt an intercept of any North Korean test. Why? Because the "most ideal" phase to shoot it down is at boost. I.e., knock the fucker down just as it hits Mach, well before it approach atmosphere exit and higher velocities. That would clearly be a violation of North Korean airspace and despite how we justified it, it would look bad. Which means that we're left with Alaska-based NMD and, as a "last resort," US-based TMD.
Which means the only scenario that we'd "knock it down" would be if the missile clearly has a trajectory that comes anywhere near the US. That's why the NMD and TMD radar and fire control systems have been activated. NTW and US Army TMD will track it as it leaves North Korea -- something we didn't have in 1998. At that point, the US will likely dismiss it as a threat and do little more than let NMD-based tracking take over and play simulatated intercepts.
However, if trajectory suggests it is a threat to the US or any of its allies, that's when NMD will launch multiple exo-atmosphere interceptors into near orbital trajectoris on sounding rockets. Mid-boost sounding, as the North Korean missile trajectory matures, an intercept will become a go/no-go decision. BTW, I'm sure a "no go" will still be taken as a "failure" or "attempt" because we merely launched the interceptors (even though they were not used). But if an intercept is decided on, and NMD fails, then it falls to TMD assets on the ground. And at that point, TMD will work. At the same time, TMD will intercept within 10 miles of altitude (it's very likely to work -- trust me, if not THAAD then definitely PAC-3!) and US/ally land, and North Korea will jump for joy that they can hit the US or one of its key allies.
Kinda ironic if you ask me!
I mean, if we believe it's on a trajectory to hit US/ally soil, and we intercept with NMD in space over international waters, we'll be lambasted for doing so. North Korea can fall back and claim it was a "space launch" even though we'll show it had no where near the exit velocity required, and was heading right towards US/ally soil. No one will understand the first thing about how NMD works, and why and where it must intercept exo-atmospherically (and not just above US/ally soil) -- let alone most people will say, "it was in space, it wasn't headed towards the US" not knowing the first thing about exit velocity and trajectories.
And if we fail to intercept with NMD, North Korea will violate our airspace and will get away with it (virtually no one but the UK will demand an apology with us) -- even if we intercept with TMD. NMD will look like a failure and no one will talk about how TMD did worked (just like they stopped talking about how TMD didn't work when it did again and again).
It's really a "no win" scenario for the US if North Korea fires a missle and it's on a trajectory towards US/ally soil. But we are activating it just in case there is that attempt -- accidental or otherwise. Last time I checked, North Korea (let alone nor does China, India, etc...) doesn't believe in installing flight termination systems -- so they can't blow it up if it boosts with an incorrect trajectory. But unlike in 1998, we now have the tools to shoot it down if it flies over Japan or other allies, let alone anywhere near US soil.
