This is a false dichotomy. The choice was not simply either accept a $50-$100 billion bailout or suffer an unavoidable and catastrophic Chapter 7 liquidation.
Chapter 11 was certainly an option at the time. It simply would have necessitated different (more significant) concessions than those that were made in the end (such as real pay cuts by the UAW, reductions in generous benefits packages, etc..). The stakeholders (not just UAW) were not required to assume their due burden. The bailout in effect became a subsidy in which the taxpayers were forced to bear the burden of GM inefficiencies, inflated labor costs, and poor decision making.
I agree with some of what you are saying. But no one is saying that GM could not have
filed Chapter 11. But without D.I.P. financing, how do you propose they would have been able to operate during this period? If and when a company can no longer show itself to be able to operate as a going concern, the creditors and the bankruptcy judge usually move the filing to Chapter 7 status.
Are you suggesting that there were D.I.P. financing sources, other than the government? Can you name them? I can tell you that no one that I know in the automotive or banking universe knew anything about these D.I.P. sources... because they didn't exist.
It wouldn't matter how many concessions the various stakeholders would have been willing to agree to if there were no funds to operate the company. And the only reason GM exited bankruptcy in such a short period of time is because the government ram rodded the process through (right or wrong). Normally this process would have taken many months, or even years. And the operational funds during this period would have come from where??? Did this government action set a bad precedent? Not for me to say. Possibly it did. But I'm a realist, not an economic philosopher.
The argument here is that if GM were allowed to file for bankruptcy protection, 2-3 million suppliers will all be suddenly out of work because no other auto makers could step in to satisfy the demand.
What demand?
What do you mean, "what demand?" It's a major mistake to believe that North American auto demand dropped to zero units, even at its worst. Demand dropped by nearly 50%, and financing what demand there was made the situation very unpleasant for all involved.
But there was most certainly some level of demand. What many people don't realize is that all it takes is one nut or bolt to be missing, and that unit cannot be sold. And there is not a single OEM in North America which controls its supply chain in such a way that it will not in some way be potentially connected to a supplier in financial difficulty. It might be some little Tier 2 supplier that produces a unique part for half a dozen Tier 1's that screws the pooch for everyone. Automotive is a much smaller world than many realize.
The concern within the industry late last year and early this year was that
any major disruption caused by a messy GM bankruptcy would affect not just the domestic N.A. OEM's, but at least most all of the N.A. foreign transplants as well - and possibly a fair number of overseas operations. Again, all it takes is one missing bolt, a missing seal, or a missing shift knob. OEM's may build out the yard, depending on how vital the part is and how easy it is to install after build. But they
cease production once the number of unsaleable vehicles reaches a certain level and the yard fills up.
Without proper market pressure, inefficient practices continue to dominate. Producers are given the incentive to continue to accept excess profits, overbuild capacity, and produce products that are not in line with consumer demand. This is the source of the problem that jeopardizes suppliers (not market adjustments).
No one is arguing that the market should not be the final voice in what is and is not produced. I've preached that and taught that for years. As for what jeopardizes suppliers, the list is a long one. The Japanese tend to use various J.I.T. models. And though they are not identical, they usually are somewhat similar. But as I've already explained, many non-OEM owned suppliers deal with many
other (non-Asian) OEM's. And their concepts of safety stock, advanced order notification, etc. can vary wildly. Diversified suppliers have to jump through many hoops, of many different sizes, depending on who and how many OEM's they deal with. Having to do that forces many (most?) to adopt production practices which use the OEM with the longest "like product" lead time as the model for all "like product" production. And that leads to inherent inefficiencies. Either OEE or maybe labor costs are negatively affected, or inventory carrying costs are excessive. But either way, profits suffer - and margins on most commodity type products are already paper thin.
I have no idea what you mean by "overbuild capacity". Do you mean the overbuilding of production facilities or maintaining facilities which have poor OEE? One might overbuild product relative to demand (to falsely increase OEE metrics for the prying eyes above) and end up wth excess
inventory, for which there is little demand. Toyota and Honda tend to better use the "demand pull" methodology, rather than the push methodology that the Americans have typically relied on for decades. But having to exceed capacity (in order to meet demand) is a sign that additional production capacity is needed = a good thing. Happy days: build another factory, hire more workers! :nanner:
As for "accepting excess profits", what is "excess profits"? Define that. Again, the market would/should determine when the sales price exceeds what the market will bare = sales will decline (at the margin). The percentage profit margin for a standard C6 Chevy Corvette is much greater than the percentage profit margin for a standard Toyota Camry. Does that mean that the profits on the Corvette are excessive? Not in my mind. The market decides at what point the price on the Vette is too high.
Daniel J. Ikenson: "And let's not pin on those of us who favor market processes the sin of "destroying the productive capacity of our largest U.S. auto manufacturer and forcing thousands of suppliers out of business." The managers of GM and the United Auto Workers did that all by themselves, by colluding in mismanagement and greed and then rationalizing their destructive behavior with the presumption that they were too big to fail and that the government would be there to clean up the mess.
Is GM really too big to fail? The question is right on point. Auto demand has plummeted in the United States over the last year. The market is contracting. Not every producer can cover its own costs and make a profit. The most efficient and worthy will survive."
Ikenson makes a fine and logical free market argument there. One that I do not dispute... as it applies to the longer term. But what I've said is quite simply a fact: in the short term, there would have been a massive wave of unemployment had GM entered a Chapter 11 which would have necessarily turned into a Chapter 7, because of a lack of available D.I.P. financing at that time.
And as much as many claim to be all for free markets and (quasi) laissez faire capitalism, the truth of the matter is, Americans
would not patiently wait around for the free market to heal itself, once unemployment hit the (as measured) 11-12% mark (actually more like 18-20% using previous methods).